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 Abstract 
According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training 
is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. 
Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the 
training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia 
induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our 
findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical 
training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly 
competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the 
wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater 
than the increase in pay. 
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1. Introduction 
 Human capital is a key determinant of economic growth. The amount of training 
individuals receive during their working life has a significant impact on their career prospects, 
wages and employability. Moreover, improving workers’ competencies is crucial in the face 
of rapid technological change. In spite of the broad consensus on the importance of training, 
there is a large debate in the economic literature and in policy circles concerning whether the 
current level of investment in training is efficient and which agent (employers or employees) 
has the incentive to invest. 
 According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general 
training — that is training which raises productivity at other employers to the same extent as 
at the employer who provides it — is fully paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from 
the investment. However, although few surveys have information on the generality of skills, 
in those that do, most of the reported job-related training appears to be employer-paid, at least 
partially, even when it is viewed by respondents as general (Barron, Berger and Black [1999], 
Loewenstein and Spletzer [1999], Booth and Bryan [2005]). Furthermore, in many surveys, 
employers appear to pay for most of off-site training (OECD [2003]), which is found by 
Loewenstein and Spletzer [1999] to be essentially general. This evidence is difficult to 
reconcile with Becker’s model unless we argue that the employee fully compensates the 
employer by accepting lower wages during (or before) training spells. Yet, no clear empirical 
support exists for this fact in the literature.1  
 Recent theories of imperfect competition in the labour market can explain why 
employers have an incentive to pay for apparently general human capital. If the market for 
trained workers is less competitive on the demand side than the market for untrained workers, 
the ratio of wages to productivity is lower for trained than for untrained workers — that is, 
wages are compressed with respect to productivity along the training dimension. In these 
circumstances, the employer has an incentive to train because he can afford to pay a trained 
worker less than the marginal product while still retaining her (see e.g. Katz and Zidermann 
 
 
1
 See among others, Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998], Barron, Berger and Black [1999] and Sicilian [2001], as 
well as Bishop [1997] for a survey of earlier studies. 
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[1990], Stevens [1994], Acemoglu and Pischke [1999a], Lazear [2003] and Booth and Zoega 
[2004]).  
In this paper, we contribute to a growing body of literature attempting at 
discriminating empirically between these two alternative theories of training, by estimating 
how the probability of receiving general training is affected by the training wage premium — 
that we approximate with the difference between the median wage growth of trained and 
untrained employees in clusters of relatively homogeneous workers. Becker's model implies a 
positive relationship between the training wage premium and the incidence of general 
training. By contrast, a negative relationship falls within the possible outcomes of training 
theories based on imperfect competition in the labour market. 
A few recent papers have provided empirical evidence that is consistent with models 
of firm-sponsored training based on imperfect competition in the labour market. In particular, 
panel data studies, which control for individual fixed effects and for job mobility, show that 
some of the benefits of general training are appropriated by workers with some lag and/or 
when they change employers. This evidence is consistent with the view that employers have 
some monopsony power over their own trained workers. For example, using data from the US 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Loewenstein and Spletzer [1999] find that, 
when training imparts general skills, the estimated effect of completed spells of employer-
paid training on earnings is three times larger for training spells completed during previous 
jobs than during the current job. Similarly, Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998] find that 
completed spells of employer-provided off-site training in the current job have no effect on 
current wages. By contrast, off-site employer-paid training received at previous employers has 
a positive and persistent impact on wages. Using more waves of the same data, Lengermann 
[1999] finds that the latter effect increases over time. Booth and Bryan [2005] study three 
recent waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and find that employer–provided 
training has a positive and persistent impact on wages, with evidence that the impact is larger 
for accredited training received at previous employers. Similar results are obtained by 
Blundell, Dearden and Meghir [1999], using three distant waves of the British National Child 
Development Survey (NCDS), and by Gerfin [2004] on Swiss data. 
However, the presence of labour market imperfections is not the only possible 
explanation of the finding that wages after a training spell grow faster if the worker changes 
jobs. For instance, workers might undertake training to qualify for jobs in other firms that are 
more efficient at employing trained workers (see e.g. Moen and Rosen [2002]) and the main 
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empirical predictions of the Becker model are therefore not necessarily in contrast with these 
findings. 
 Another way of discriminating between alternative theories of training is to investigate 
the relationship between the minimum wage and training incidence. According to Becker, 
high minimum wages should decrease investments in human capital, as they would prevent 
minimum wage workers from accepting wage cuts to finance training. By contrast, in the 
alternative theories of training, the greater the minimum wage the greater the incentive for 
firms to pay for general training. The reason is that, in imperfectly competitive labour market, 
the minimum wage compresses the lower tail of the wage distribution without necessarily 
affecting individual productivity (see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke [2003]). However, recent 
empirical studies both in the United States and in the United Kingdom report contradictory 
findings on the impact of the minimum wage on training.2 There are several possible reasons 
why this strand of research is inconclusive. For instance, in countries where the minimum 
wage is high, it might be difficult to find a group which is not directly or indirectly affected 
by the minimum wage and qualifies as a genuine control. Conversely, in countries where the 
minimum wage is particularly low, the incidence of training in the treatment group is likely to 
be extremely small, since training is relatively infrequent at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. Moreover, most of these studies focus on changes of the minimum wage over 
time, but it is not clear what time horizon is appropriate to analyze the effect of institutional 
changes such as increments in the minimum wage. Last but not least, the degree of 
imperfection of the labour market might differ across countries.  
 The approach we follow in this paper is similar to that taken by studies of minimum 
wage and training, insofar as we focus on the implications of the different theories on the 
relationship between wage premia and training. We use cross-country data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and partition workers into clusters of relatively 
homogeneous employees (in terms of country, education, occupation and sector). We then 
construct cluster-specific measures of the training wage premium – that we compute as the 
difference between the median wage growth rates of trained and untrained employees – and 
investigate whether these measures have a significant impact on general training, after dealing 
 
 
2
 See Grossberg and Sicilian [1999], Neumark and Wascher [2001], and Acemoglu and Pischke [2003], for the 
United States, and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan [2004], for the United Kingdom. 
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with the potential problems of endogeneity. We find a negative relationship between our 
measure of the training wage premium and the probability of taking general training. Our 
findings are inconsistent with the Becker model, which implies a positive relationship 
between the training wage premium and the incidence of general training. Conversely, 
although we cannot observe individual productivity gains from training, our findings can be 
interpreted as lower bound estimates of the impact of wage compression on training, to the 
extent that the (unobserved) productivity premium and the (observed) wage premium are not 
negatively correlated. Under this condition, our findings are consistent with theories based on 
imperfect competition. This approach seems to us particularly suitable to analyse the 
empirical relevance of different theories of training using European data: since the migration 
of labour between EU countries is still limited, we can meaningfully use the country 
dimension in the definition of clusters, which allows us to construct a sample with a large 
number of clusters and to obtain significant variation in our measures of the training premium.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical approach, Section 
3 describes the data and Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation of the empirical results. 
Conclusions follow. 
 
2. General Training and Wage Premia 
 
To fix the ideas and discuss our empirical specification, in this section we briefly 
sketch a simplified two-period model of general training, which essentially corresponds to the 
Becker model in the case of perfect competition, and to a simplified version of the model by 
Acemoglu and Pischke [1999a] in the case of imperfect competition. 
 In the first period a worker is matched with an employer and training can take place. In 
the second period, the worker can quit if she receives a better wage offer. Let us denote with 
)(τf , )(τw  and )(τv  the worker’s second period labour productivity, wage and outside 
option, respectively, with τ = 1 indicating that the individual takes general training in the first 
period (while τ = 0 indicates that no training takes place). Let us assume that training is 
perfectly general, which is equivalent to assume that )(τf  and )(τv  do not vary across firms. 
In the case of perfect competition considered by Becker, )()()( τττ vwf ==  and 
vwf ∆=∆=∆ , where )0()1( www −=∆  is the wage premium and f∆  and v are similarly 
defined. Since 0=∆−∆ wf , if training costs c(1) are positive and c(0)=0 the employer does 
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not invest. Conversely, and assuming no discounting for simplicity, the worker invests and 
pays the training costs as long as )1(cw >∆ . If training costs vary across workers, the greater 
the wage premium, the larger the number of employees that are ready to pay for training. In 
other words, for a given individual i, the probability that she decides to take training can be 
written as: 
 
{ } { })1(Pr1Pr iii cwobob >∆==τ   [1] 
 
 If we remove the assumption of perfect competition on the demand side, the worker 
has to incur a cost upon quitting — that is, her outside option )(τv is below her productivity 
)(τf  by the amount D(τ)>0. Assume that the current employer wants to retain the trained 
worker. He can offer the worker a wage w equal to her outside option v plus a fraction of the 
gap D, that is )1()1())1()1(()1()1( Dvvfvw ββ +=−+= , where β<1 represent the worker’s 
bargaining power. In the absence of training, the wage offered to retain her would have been 
)0()0())0()0(()0()0( Dvvfvw ββ +=−+= . Assuming that workers cannot bear any training 
cost (e.g. because of borrowing constraints), the expected profits from training and no training 
are ( ) )1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1( cvfcwf −−−=−−= βpi  and ( ))0()0()1()0()0()0( vfwf −−=−= βpi  
respectively. In the decision to invest in general training, the employer compares the expected 
profits from training with the expected profits in the event of no training. The employer 
decides to bear the training costs if and only if )1(cwf >∆−∆  or, equivalently, 
)1/()1( β−>∆−∆ cvf . This inequality will hold if training costs are sufficiently small and D 
is an increasing function of training, since when D’(τ)>0, 0>∆−∆ vf . There are several 
types of labour market imperfections on the demand side that might make D’(τ)>0: firms may 
lack of information on previous training of job candidates; search costs might be greater for 
trained workers; general and firm-specific skills might be difficult to separate and might, 
therefore, be imparted together; labour demand might also be distorted by institutions such as 
coordinated industrial relations or pay-back clauses3 (see Acemoglu and Pischke [1999b] for a 
 
 
3
 For instance, contracts with pay-back clauses typically impose that the worker pays-back part of training costs 
incurred by the firm if she quits within a specified period and the firm can show that skills learned 
through training are useful for the worker in the new job. When applicable, these contracts 
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survey). Lazear [2003] suggests that this pattern might also emerge if skills are a multi-
dimensional variable, with different firms using different combinations of general skills. If 
training costs vary across workers, the more compressed the wage structure (the higher 
wf ∆−∆ ), the larger the number of employees for which employers are ready to pay for 
training. For a given individual i, the probability that she receive employer–paid training is: 
 
{ } { })1(Pr1Pr iiii cwfobob >∆−∆==τ   [2] 
 
 With a similar argument, it can be shown that, even when workers bear some of the 
training cost, the employer’s investment in general training increases with wage compression. 
In this case, however, total investment in training may or may not increase with wage 
compression, since the incentives for the employee to invest in training are greater, the greater 
the training wage premium w. In the special case of perfect competition, the investment in 
training is paid by the employee and is increasing with the wage premium. 
 It stands out from this discussion that the case of perfect competition considered by 
Becker can be viewed as a special case of the Acemoglu and Pischke model: in the absence of 
labour market frictions, D is equal to zero )()()( τττ vwf == and the employer never pays 
for general training.  
Taking into account that the training that is reported to be employer-sponsored might 
be indirectly paid by the worker by accepting lower wages during training, equations [1] and 
[2] can be generalised as: 
 
{ } { })1(Pr1Pr iiii cwfobob δσγτ >∆+∆==  [3] 
 
In fact, from equation [1] we expect γ = 0, σ = 1 (or, more generally, σ > 0) and δ = 1, in the 
case of the Becker model. Conversely, in the extreme case of the Acemoglu and Pischke 
model where only firms pay for training (equation [2]), we expect γ =1, σ = -1 and δ = 1. 
Finally, in the general case of the Acemoglu and Pischke model in which both firms and 
workers can pay for training, workers’ investment will be represented by [1] and firms’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
temporarily increase worker’s cost of quitting (except for reasons unrelated to the content of training), 
thereby creating a captive market for the training firm. 
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investments by [2], therefore total training investments can be represented by equation [3] 
with γ > 0, σ ≥ -γ and δ > 0. 
 Employers and employees decide on the investment in training by forming 
expectations about the training wage premium. We posit that agents form their expectations 
by looking at the current wage distribution for trained and untrained employees. The 
heterogeneity of workers and jobs suggests, however, that the relevant distribution should not 
be the entire wage distribution, but rather an appropriate portion of it. Therefore, we partition 
individuals into relatively homogeneous clusters and approximate the training wage premium 
with the difference between the median wage growth rates of those who reported to have 
received training in the period covered by the survey and of those who did not. Individual 
wages are affected both by the current training investment and by the accumulated training 
stock before the sample period. Since we can observe individual training history only for very 
few years, a substantial part of this stock is not observed. By using growth rates rather than 
levels, we are able to eliminate the influence on wages of the training stock accumulated 
before the reference period. We call this measure the wage growth differential.  
 Without cross-country comparable matched employer-employee datasets (see 
Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi [2005]), there are no cross-country data on individual 
productivity. Therefore, we treat the productivity gain from training f∆  as an omitted 
variable and discriminate among competing theories on the basis of the estimate of the 
parameter σ. This implies that if we find 0ˆ <σ  (with ^ standing for estimate), then we will 
conclude that our evidence is in contrast with the empirical prediction of the Becker model. 
Conversely, we will not be able to discriminate among different theories if we find 0ˆ ≥σ . 
 How does the omission of the productivity gain f∆  bias our estimates? If the Becker 
model were true, omitting the productivity gain from the specification would induce no bias, 
since its expected coefficient is zero. Conversely, in the Acemoglu and Pischke model, to the 
extent that productivity and wage premia are not negatively correlated, the omission of the 
former would at most bias our estimates of σ against finding a negative relationship between 
the wage premium w∆  and training incidence. In this case, our estimate of σ could be 
interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the impact of wage compression on training. 
 We do not observe training costs directly. Yet, we assume that worker's opportunity 
costs of training and liquidity constraints can be captured by a set of variables related to the 
employee’s household, such as the household structure, family responsibilities and the 
financial situation of the household (we will call these variables “family variables” hereafter). 
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As training incidence typically vary with firm size, individual age, tenure in the job, 
educational attainment, type of labour contract, previous unemployment record, sector of 
activity, occupation and country, we also let training costs vary along these dimensions. 
Letting cW  be the wage growth differential in cluster c and X the vector of controls 
potentially capturing training costs, our empirical specification then becomes 
 
{ } { }0Pr1Pr >+∆++== iccicic WXobob εσβατ         [4] 
 
where the null hypothesis is 0≥σ , as implied by the Becker model. 
A potential objection to our empirical proxy of the wage premium is that it can be 
endogenous. For instance, if there are diminishing returns to human capital and trained and 
untrained workers are imperfect substitutes in production, we expect that the greater the stock 
of previously accumulated training the lower the productivity gain from training. Therefore, 
to the extent that the stock of previously accumulated training and the flow of training taken in 
the period covered by our data are correlated, we may find a negative relationship between the 
training wage premium and the probability of training even if the Becker's model is true. 
To take this issue into account, we test the hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the wage 
growth differential by following the methodology suggested by Smith and Blundell [1986]. 
To implement this test, we need to select at least one exogenous variable which is correlated 
with cW  but is independent of training incidence (or the probability of training), conditional 
on cW . Our selected instrument is the difference between the log median age of those who 
have received training and the log median age of those who have not (we call this difference 
the log age differential and denote it with cA ).4 
We expect cA  and cW  to be correlated because training wage premia have been 
found to decrease with age, at least in European countries (see e.g. OECD, 2004). This result 
is typically explained by the fact that, in the absence of training, the wedge between 
productivity and the wage tends to decrease with age (see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz, 2003 and 
Aubert and Crepon, 2004, for France), due to labour market institutions and sectoral 
characteristics that affect the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity as well as the extent 
 
 
4
 This measure roughly corresponds to the percentage difference between the two medians divided by 100. 
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of internal labour markets. As workers get older, thus, training simply allows matching non-
decreasing wages with otherwise decreasing productivity, with no apparent wage premium. 
We argue that cA  also satisfies the orthogonality condition for instrument validity. 
First, there is no compelling reason for a direct causal impact of cA  (which is an aggregate 
age variable) on the probability of training, once we have controlled for observable individual 
characteristics, including individual age.5 Second, cA  is not affected by diminishing returns 
by construction: with diminishing returns, an increase in the number of trained employees is 
likely to affect the wage of all workers, but has no influence on demographic characteristics 
such as age. True, since younger workers are likely to be trained first, we expect that the 
greater the incidence of training, the greater the median (log) age of workers who receive 
training as well as of those who do not. But the log age differential cA  will not be affected if 
the two distributions — of the log age of workers who receive training and of those who do 
not — have the same degree of concentration around their respective medians.6 If this is the 
case — as we show it is at the end of the next section — diminishing returns affect relative 
prices cW  without affecting relative ages cA . 
 
 
 
5
 A direct effect might emerge in the presence of large human capital externalities, if the intensity of these 
externalities varies with age. We exclude this possibility since we are aware of no evidence supporting 
this hypothesis in the literature. 
6
 To see this, assume first that, in a given cluster, an individual is trained if and only if her age is below a given 
threshold, and that increasing training incidence implies shifting this threshold upwards, thereby 
making the youngest individuals in the group of the untrained switch to the group of the trained, of 
which they become the oldest. The crucial point is that both the median log ages of trained and 
untrained workers are lifted up, but the size of their relative increase depends on the concentration of 
the log age distribution in the neighbourhood of the two medians. If the distribution has the same 
degree of concentration in the neighbourhood of the two medians, the difference between them is 
independent from either the size of the groups and/or the exact age of switching individuals, and 
therefore the aggregate training rate (this statement is derived formally in the working paper version 
of this article - Bassanini and Brunello [2006] - which the reader is referred to also for the extension 
of the argument to the general case). 
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3. Data 
 We use individual data from the December 2001 release of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), which is a longitudinal survey modelled on the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). This survey provides a wealth of information on individual income and 
socio-economic characteristics for all EU countries and aims to be representative both in 
cross-sections and longitudinally. Due to the common questionnaire, the information 
contained in the ECHP is, in principle, comparable across countries, which is its main 
strength. 
We use training data from the 1996 wave of the ECHP for 7 countries7 and restrict our 
attention to male employees (excluding apprentices), aged from 30 to 60 years8 and working 
full-time in the non-agricultural private sector, excluding sectors where non-profit 
organizations account for a non-negligible fraction of employment. 
 The main question on vocational training in the ECHP is as follows "Have you at any 
time since January (year before the survey year) been in any vocational education or training, 
including part-time and short-courses?". From this question, we construct a dichotomous 
variable "training participation", which takes value 1 if the individual responded "yes" and 0 
if she responded "no". Conditional on a positive answer, the individual is asked to report 
additional information on the last course only (including the type, whether it is still ongoing at 
the date of the survey and whether it is paid for or provided by the employer). If more than 
one concurrent course are involved, only the information concerning the course considered by 
the respondent as the most important is reported. Table 1 shows training events and training 
incidence — trained individuals as a percentage of the relevant population — by country and 
selected characteristics. About 17 percent of the individuals in our sample have experienced 
training, but there is a large cross-country variation. The country ranking that is shown in the 
table is similar to what emerges from other cross-country European surveys, such as Eurostat 
 
 
7
 The choice of the survey year and the country sample is dictated by data availability (see Bassanini and 
Brunello [2006]). Included countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. 
8
 We exclude individuals under 30 to reduce the risk that our results be altered by different national institutions 
affecting the school-to-work transition (such as different apprenticeship systems, with different 
degrees of government support). 
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Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS) (see Nestler and Kailis [2002] and OECD 
[2003]).  
 
Table 1: Training events, by country and selected characteristics. 
Country Individuals receiving 
training (in % of the total) 
Other Characteristics Individual receiving 
training (in % of the total) 
Austria 159 (21.1) Less than upper sec. education 201 (7.7) 
Belgium 110 (19.9) Upper secondary education 550 (18.4) 
France 201 (15.5) More than upper sec. education 443 (33.7) 
Germany 219 (19.9) Mining, manuf. and utilities 653 (15.0) 
Italy 81 (6.7) Services 541 (21.4) 
Spain 150 (11.8) High-skilled occupations 622 (31.0) 
United Kingdom 274 (39.1) Medium-skilled occupations 538 (12.4) 
Total 1194 (17.3) Low-skilled occupations 34 (6.3) 
Note: male employees, aged from 30 to 60 years and working full-time in the non-agricultural private 
sector, excluding sectors where non-profit organizations have a non-negligible share of employment. The 
table shows the number of individuals who reported to have received training in the 1996 survey, by 
country and selected characteristics. Training incidence (trained individuals as a percentage of the 
relevant population) is reported in parentheses. 
 
Respondents who have been in vocational education or training are asked to select the 
type of training received among the following categories: a) third level qualification, such as 
technical college; b) specific vocational training at a vocational school or college; c) specific 
vocational training within a system providing both work experience and complementary 
instruction elsewhere; d) specific vocational training in a working environment, without 
complementary instruction elsewhere; e) other. The distribution of training events by type is 
5.1 percent for type a, 16.3 percent for type b, 11.1 percent for type c, 64.6 percent for type d, 
and 2.8 percent for type e. The questionnaire also asks individuals whether the last vocational 
training course was paid for or organized by the employer. As expected, about 86.9% of the 
courses on which the information is available are paid for or organized by the employer. 
Interestingly, the more formal the training the lower the employer support: 57% for third level 
qualification, such as technical college; 76% for specific vocational training at a vocational 
school or college; 92% for specific vocational training within a system providing both work 
experience and complementary instruction elsewhere; and 95% for vocational training in a 
working environment. 
As said in the previous section, our empirical measure of the training premium is 
based on comparing the wage growth rates of individuals who reported to have received 
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training in the period covered by the survey and of those who did not — hereafter we will 
refer to them as “trained” and “untrained”, respectively. Individual wage growth is computed 
as the difference between the log gross hourly wage reported in the current wave – year 1996 
– and the log wage reported in the previous wave – year 1995 – by the same individual. In the 
case of Austria, for which 1995 wage data are not comparable with those from other years 
(see the appendix), we replace the 1995-1996 wage growth with that of 1996-1997. 
Additional information on wages is reported in the appendix. 
Table 2 shows the difference between the median wage growth rates of trained and 
untrained individuals by country, educational attainment, occupation, and sector of activity. 
The median wage growth of trained individuals is lower than the median wage growth of the 
untrained in Germany and Italy, although the difference in these countries is close to zero. 
The table shows a wage return in the range 0-4 percent. Although these figures might seem 
low, they are consistent with panel data estimates based on European data (see Pischke 
[2001], Booth and Bryan [2005], Gerfin [2004], Schøne [2004] and OECD [2004]). The 
simple comparison of Table 2 and Table 1 shows no clear correlation pattern between training 
and wage premia at this aggregate level. 
 
Table 2: Wage growth gaps between trained and untrained workers. 
Country Median wage growth, 
difference trained / 
untrained (%) 
Other Characteristics Median wage growth, 
difference trained / 
untrained (%) 
Austria 1.05 [1.32] Less than upper sec. education -0.08 [1.50] 
Belgium 0.33 [1.85] Upper secondary education 0.34 [0.35] 
France 1.38 [0.72] More than upper sec. education 1.17 [0.93] 
Germany -0.17 [0.97] Mining, manuf. and utilities 1.15 [0.63] 
Italy -0.21 [2.68] Services 0.00 [0.63] 
Spain 4.52 [2.32] High-skilled occupations -0.24 [0.90] 
United Kingdom 0.05 [1.48] Medium-skilled occupations 0.61 [0.52] 
Average 0.29 [0.23] Low-skilled occupations 5.19 [5.63] 
Note: Percentage point difference between the median wage growth rates of those who reported to have 
received training in the period covered by the 1996 survey (1997 for Austria) and of those who did not. The 
sample is limited to full-time male employees aged from 30 to 60 years and working in the non-agricultural 
business sector, excluding individuals who reported to be still in training at the time of the survey. Wage data 
refer to 1995-1996 for all countries except for Austria, for which they refer to 1996-1997. Medians are 
weighted by cross-sectional weights. Bootstrapped standard errors, obtained with 100 replications, in brackets. 
 
 We compute our empirical proxy of the training wage premium (that we called "wage 
growth differential" in the previous section and denoted with cW  in equation [4]) by cluster. 
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We define clusters by four dimensions: the country, the educational attainment (less than 
upper secondary, upper secondary, more than upper secondary), the broad group of sectors 
(mining, manufacturing, utilities and construction, and services), and the broad occupational 
group (high-skilled occupations and medium- and low-skilled occupations).9 By so doing we 
obtain 12 clusters per country, but some of them are empty.10 
The wage growth differential cW  is obtained by computing for each cluster the 
difference between the median wage growth rates of the employees who reported to have 
received training in the period covered by the survey11 and of those who did not, excluding 
workers who either changed cluster between the two wage observations or have missing 
cluster affiliation in one of the relevant interviews (about 6.5% of the sample). Since our 
measure of the wage growth differential should capture the cluster-specific premium to 
completed training spells, we exclude from this calculation also all individuals who reported 
to be still in training at the time of the survey or have missing information on this question 
(about 19.4% of individuals who received training in the period covered by the survey).12 
Although we limit our regression analysis to workers employed in sectors where non-profit 
organizations are not important, we consider all employees in the non-public service sector in 
the computation of the wage growth differential. This is done because we believe that the 
whole private service sector should be considered as the relevant market for service sector 
workers. Finally, in order to reduce the weight of outliers, we drop clusters with 30 
 
 
9
 corresponding to managers, professional technicians and associate professional — ISCO-88 codes 1 to 3 — and 
to clerks, service and sales workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and 
assemblers, and elementary occupations — ISCO-88 codes 4 to 9 —, respectively. Low-skilled 
occupations are aggregated to medium-skilled occupations since the size and training incidence of this 
occupational group is too small to be used separately in the definition of clusters (see Table 1). 
10
 Given that in our data sectors and, especially, occupations are defined at a lower level of aggregation (see 
appendix), it might be argued that a finer partition of the data should be used to define clusters. 
However, since our empirical measure of the training premium controls for time-invariant 
heterogeneity within clusters (see below), the error induced by heterogeneity in large clusters is likely 
to be smaller than the error induced by small cluster size. Nevertheless, in a sensitivity analysis, we 
explore the effect of different partitions by varying the grouping of occupations (see Bassanini and 
Brunello [2006]).  
11
 That is, for growth rates between 1995 and 1996, those who reported to have received training in the 1996 
survey and, for growth rates between 1996 and 1997, those who reported to have received training in 
the 1997 survey. 
12
 Ideally, we would like to control for the number of spells of training in the period covered by the survey. Yet, 
this information is not available in the ECHP. The lack of this control constitutes an important limit to 
the conclusiveness of our results. 
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observations or less and with less than 5 reported training events, and remain with 47 valid 
clusters.13 Overall, we observe no clear pattern of cross-cluster bivariate correlation between 
training incidence and the wage growth differential (the correlation coefficient between these 
variables at the cluster level being only -0.13). 
 One problem with this measure of the training wage premium is that, given the 
formulation of the questions on training in the ECHP questionnaire (see above), when we 
compute the wage growth differential we misclassify as trained certain individuals who in fact 
received training only between January of the year before the current survey and the date of 
the previous survey (that is, except for Austria, between January 1995 and the date of the 
1995 survey). As shown by Frazis and Loewenstein [1999], this implies that the computed 
wage growth differential will tend to be smaller than the value we would obtain if we focused 
only on training taken between the two survey dates (that is the dates of the two wage 
observations). Notice, however, that, to the extent that there is no reason why the proportion 
of misclassified individuals in a cluster should vary with training incidence, we can expect 
measurement error not to be systematically related to training incidence at the cluster level. In 
other words, this type of measurement error will, at most, bias our results towards zero, 
thereby making a rejection of the Becker model more difficult. Moreover, the absence of a 
systematic relationship between training incidence and measurement error can be tested by 
following the same instrumental variable procedure suggested by Smith and Blundell [1986], 
that we discussed in the previous section. 
In the previous section we argued that the difference in the log median age of trained 
and untrained employees (the log age differential cA ) is a valid instrument for the wage 
growth differential cW . We noted, however, that this statement is correct only if there is no 
systematic difference in the concentration of the log age distributions in the neighbourhood of 
the median age of those who received training and of those who did not. These hypotheses 
can be verified by computing for each cluster, and for two quantiles that are not far from the 
median, the interquantile difference for both age distributions and by checking whether their 
cross-cluster averages are systematically different. We performed this test for the difference 
 
 
13
 These threshold limits reduce the number of clusters by more than one third. Not surprisingly, however, 
retained clusters accounts for a much larger share of observations with non-missing wages (see 
appendix). Nevertheless, we checked the robustness of our results by lifting these size thresholds. 
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between the 55th and the 45th percentiles, the 60th and the 40th percentile and the 70th and the 
30th percentiles. As shown in Table 3, no significant difference emerges for any of the three, 
which supports the validity of cA  as an instrument. 
 Further details on the construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis as 
well as descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.  
 
Table 3: Tests of differences in the concentration of the log age 
distribution around the medians of the trained and the untrained. 
Interquantile difference cross-cluster average difference 
 
P55-P45 
 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
 
 
P60-P40 
 
-0.011  
(0.013) 
 
 
P70-P30 
 
-0.012  
(0.016) 
 
Note: The table reports the cross-cluster average differences between any given 
interquantile difference for the log age distribution of those who received 
training and the same interquantile difference for the log age distribution of those 
who did not receive training. Averages are weighted by cluster size. Standard 
errors in parentheses  
 
 
4. The Empirical Results 
 
 Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a probit model of the 
probability of taking any type of training, using the cluster - specific wage growth differential 
cW∆  as our measure of the training wage premium, and testing its weak exogeneity with 
respect to training. Second, we re-estimate our model by focusing exclusively on training that 
is likely to be general. A series of robustness checks on the latter specification are presented 
in the working paper version of this article (Bassanini and Brunello, [2006]). 
Table 4 shows the results of the first model, in which the dependent variable, training 
participation T, is equal to one in the event of training and to zero in the event of no training. 
The table is divided into two panels: Panel A refers to all training with no distinction in terms 
of financing; in Panel B we also use the available information on who financed the last 
training course and repeat the analysis by focusing on the probability of receiving employer-
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sponsored training.14 In this case, we redefine the dependent variable T and set it equal to one 
in the event of employer – provided training and to zero in the event of no training.  
We take explicitly into account the fact that the training variable T and the wage 
growth differential cW  are measured at different levels of aggregation and adjust the 
standard errors by allowing errors to be independent between clusters and correlated within 
clusters (as suggested by Moulton [1986]). The table reports only the relevant coefficients 
from each equation. Full results are available from authors. 
We consider two specifications: the first specification includes only basic controls 
(family variables, age, education, occupation, sector and country; Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7), the 
second includes an extended set of controls (adding firm size, tenure, permanent job and 
previous unemployment; Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). The first two columns of each panel report 
standard estimates, while the other columns report IV estimates obtained with the procedure 
suggested by Smith and Blundell [1986]: we compute the residual from the first stage 
regression in which the wage differential is regressed on the cluster–specific instrument cA  
and on country, occupation, education and sector dummies; then we add this variable to the 
probit specification and re-estimate it. The estimated coefficient of cW  that we obtain with 
this procedure is a consistent IV estimate of the impact of the wage growth differential. 
Furthermore, we can also test the weak exogeneity of the wage growth differential cW  by 
checking whether the estimated coefficient associated to the residual from the first stage 
regression is statistically different from zero.  
 
 
14
 While we do not know whether workers indirectly paid for employer-sponsored training by accepting lower 
wages, we can be relatively confident that employers did not pay for courses that are reported to be 
non-sponsored. It might therefore be desirable to eliminate these events from our dependent variable, 
since alternative theories have identical predictions for them under all circumstances. When the last 
training course is not reported to be employer-sponsored, we set therefore T to missing since we do 
not know whether the individual has taken employer-sponsored courses before the last one in the 
period covered by the survey. 
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Table 4. Probits for total training. Dependent variable: training participation T in 1996. 
Panel A: all training 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wage growth differential -0.039 
[0.083] 
-0.067 
[0.080] 
-0.381 
[0.259] 
-0.460 
[0.233]** 
Residual from first stage regression   0.358 
[0.278] 
0.358 
[0.278] 
Basic controls yes yes yes yes 
Extended controls no yes no yes 
Number of observations 5898 5515 5898 5515 
F-test on instrument significance  5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Wald-test of homoskedasticity (χ2(2)) 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.27 
Pseudo R-squared 0.154 0.179 0.154 0.179 
 
Panel B: Employer-sponsored training 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Wage growth differential 0.002 
[0.091] 
-0.036 
[0.084] 
-0.347 
[0.245] 
-0.417 
[0.211]** 
Residual from first stage regression   0.364 
[0.268] 
0.400 
[0.238]* 
Basic controls yes yes yes yes 
Extended controls no yes no yes 
Number of observations 5791 5412 5791 5412 
F-test on instrument significance  5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Wald-test of homoskedasticity (χ2(2)) 0.59 1.20 0.21 0.92 
Pseudo R-squared 0.167 0.201 0.168 0.202 
 
Note: The table reports marginal percentage-point effects. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors within 
brackets. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Individuals reporting non-sponsored training 
are excluded from Panel B. Each column of each panel refers to a different specification. Basic controls are 
country, education, occupation and sector dummies plus age and family variables. Specifications with extended 
controls add firm size, tenure, permanent job status and previous unemployment dummies to basic controls. In 
the first stage the wage growth differential is regressed on the median log age differential, country, occupation, 
education and sector dummies. The Wald test statistic, which is used to test the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity against the alternative of multiplicative heteroskedasticity modelled as a function of the wage 
growth differential and its square, is distributed as a χ2(2) under the null. **, *: significant at the 5% and 10% 
level of confidence, respectively. 
 
The results that emerge from Table 4 are inconclusive. On the one hand, standard 
estimates point to no correlation between the wage growth differential cW  and the 
probability of training. On the other hand, IV estimates tend to suggest a much more negative 
and sometimes significant relationship.15 Exogeneity tests, however, are not clear-cut as 
regards which estimation procedure should be preferred. In fact, even though in Panel A 
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 One possible explanation of this difference is that standard estimates are strongly affected by measurement 
error, while diminishing returns are a second order problem. 
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residuals are insignificant, thereby not rejecting the exogeneity hypothesis, they are often 
large in absolute terms. Furthermore, according to the results reported in Panel B, the 
exogeneity hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level in one specification.16 
In Table 4 we do not distinguish between general and firm-specific training. This is 
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, alternative theories have different predictions on the 
relationship between the training wage premium and training only with regard to general 
training. Second, the inconclusive results reported in the table might be driven by the 
heterogeneity of training.17  
We do not have in our dataset information on the generality of skills imparted through 
training. However, as noted in the previous section, respondents who have been in vocational 
education or training are asked to classify their last course in one (and only one) of the 
following mutually exclusive categories: a) third level qualification, such as technical college; 
b) specific vocational training at a vocational school or college; c) specific vocational training 
within a system providing both work experience and complementary instruction elsewhere; d) 
specific vocational training in a working environment, without complementary instruction 
elsewhere; e) other. Following Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998] and OECD [2003] we can 
use the distinction between off-site and workplace training to proxy the distinction between 
general and firm-specific training. Assuming that off-site training tend to be more general 
than workplace training – assumption that appears to be supported by empirical evidence on 
US data (see Loewenstein and Spletzer [1999]) – we treat categories a, b and c as “general 
training” and category d as “firm-specific training”.18 Nevertheless, since training falling 
under category c is partly taken off-site and partly received in the workplace, we also 
experiment with a different classification by assigning category c to “firm-specific training”. 
Throughout the remainder of the paper we will refer to the former classification as “extensive 
definition of general training” and to the latter as “restrictive definition of general training”. 
 
 
16  The ambiguity of these results is not thoroughly surprising given that our instrument is relatively weak: the 
value of the F test on the significance of the instrument is 5.0, which is relatively low (although 
statistically significant at the 5% level). 
17
 For instance, if the true wage premium to firm-specific training is close to zero or at least much smaller than 
the true wage premium to general training, our wage growth differential cW  will tend to be more 
correlated with the latter than with the former; therefore, the greater the share of firm-specific training 
in total training in our sample, the greater the importance of measurement error. 
18
 The option "other" cannot be classified and we choose to drop it from the sample. 
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We must be clear, however, that both classifications are just proxies of the distinction we are 
trying to capture. These proxies are based on the common sense assumption that the 
generality of skills imparted through training is decreasing from a to d. Yet, despite the terms 
we adopt in the remainder of the paper to simplify our presentation, the reader should not 
view training falling into each category as entirely general or firm-specific. 
 Table 5 reports results obtained by re-estimating the models of Table 4 (Panel A) 
using general training as the dependent variable. In this case, we exclude the observations 
where the last training course is reported to be firm – specific, since we do not know whether 
these individuals received also general training in the period covered by the survey (as 
discussed above, only one answer is allowed in the questionnaire). Three results stand out. 
First, under both definitions, standard estimates suggest a statistically significant negative 
correlation between the wage growth differential cW  and the probability of receiving 
general training.19 Second, since the coefficient of the residual from the first stage is relatively 
small and statistically insignificant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity 
of the wage growth differential cW . Third, once the residual is added to the specification, 
the estimated coefficient of the wage growth differential becomes less statistically significant. 
Notice, however, that the inclusion of the residual leads to inefficient estimates under the 
hypothesis of weak exogeneity.20 Overall, these results suggest that there is a negative 
relationship between the training wage premium and the individual probability of attending a 
general training course. These findings appear inconsistent with the Becker model, which 
predicts a positive relationship between the training wage premium and the incidence of 
general training. The estimated impact, however, is rather small: taking, for example, the 
estimates in the first panel, we obtain that doubling the wage growth differential from its 
 
 
19
 One might argue that we should use as wage growth differential the difference between the wage growth of 
those who received general training and of those who received no training. However, due to the 
relatively low incidence of general training, we would be left with only 15 valid clusters after 
applying our size thresholds. For this reason, we do so only in the sensitivity analysis reported 
Bassanini and Brunello [2006], with no qualitative change of results. 
20
 This argument appears more compelling in the case of the extensive definition, where the residual from the 
first stage is close to zero. However, when the restrictive definition is used, IV estimates remain 
significant at least at the 10% level. In interpreting this figure, note that it might be argued that, given 
the structure of our null hypothesis, a one-tail test would be more appropriate than a two-tail test. P-
values derived on the basis of two-tail tests can be seen as lower bounds to the actual P-value. 
  
 
20 
sample mean (1.95 percentage points) would reduce the probability of general training (using 
its “extensive” definition) by only 3.1 percent.21 
 
Table 5. Probits for general training. Dependent variable: Participation in general training in 1996. 
Panel A: Extensive definition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wage growth differential -0.079 
[0.025]*** 
-0.083 
[0.024]*** 
-0.091 
[0.073] 
-0.101 
[0.072] 
Residual from first stage regression   0.013 
[0.073] 
0.019 
[0.072] 
Basic controls yes yes yes Yes 
Extended controls no yes no Yes 
Number of observations 5178 4857 5178 4857 
F-test on instrument significance  5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Wald-test of homoskedasticity (χ2(2)) 1.02 0.20 0.99 0.23 
Pseudo R-squared 0.226 0.243 0.226 0.243 
 
Panel B: Restrictive definition 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Wage growth differential -0.048 
[0.019]*** 
-0.053 
[0.019]*** 
-0.088 
[0.045]** 
-0.092 
[0.047]* 
Residual from first stage regression   0.043 
[0.041] 
0.041 
[0.043] 
Basic controls yes yes yes Yes 
Extended controls no yes no Yes 
Number of observations 5090 4771 5090 4771 
F-test on instrument significance  5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Wald-test of homoskedasticity (χ2(2)) 0.77 0.53 1.01 0.69 
Pseudo R-squared 0.244 0.250 0.244 0.250 
 
Note: The table reports marginal percentage-point effects. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors within 
parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Individuals reporting firm-specific training 
are excluded from the sample. Each column of each panel refers to a different specification. The extensive 
definition of general training is used in Panel A, the restrictive one in Panel B. Basic controls are country, 
education, occupation and sector dummies plus age and family variables. Specifications with extended controls 
add firm size, tenure, permanent job status and previous unemployment dummies to basic controls. In the first 
stage the wage growth differential is regressed on the median log age differential, country, occupation, education 
and sector dummies. The Wald test statistic, which is used to test the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity against 
the alternative of multiplicative heteroskedasticity modelled as a function of the wage growth differential and its 
square, is distributed as a χ2(2) under the null. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 
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  More precisely, Table 5, Panel A shows that a 1 percentage point change in the wage growth 
differential would induce a change in the probability of training of about 0.08 percentage points. 
Taking into account that the sample incidence of general training is 5.19 percent, this translates into an 
elasticity of 0.031. 
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 One potentially serious problem in probit models is the violation of the assumption of 
homoskedasticity. For this reason, in order to check for heteroskedastic error terms of the 
latent variable, we allow their standard deviation to be a multiplicative function of a subset of 
explanatory variables and their powers, as suggested by Harvey [1976]. In so doing, we 
follow the standard approach of choosing parsimonious specifications for the error variances 
(see e.g. Greene Knapp and Seaks [1992]). Tables 4 and 5 present Wald test statistics for error 
variances that are functions of the wage growth differential and its square and show no sign of 
heteroskedasticity. Similar results occur if error variances are also allowed to vary across any 
of the cluster dimensions. 
 A second potentially important problem that might affect our results is that we do not 
distinguish between short and long courses. To the extent that wage premia to longer courses 
might be greater, a negative relationship between wage premia and training might not be 
inconsistent with the Becker model. For instance, there might be clusters with many mini 
courses (that is, with high training incidence) that are likely to yield no training wage 
premium and other clusters with few long courses (that is, low training incidence) yielding 
quite naturally high wage premia. Information on course length in ECHP data is, however, 
difficult to use, since it is often missing in certain countries, and the distribution of training 
courses is heavily concentrated in the neighbourhood of zero (with half of the courses of a 
duration of less than 10 days). To check that our results are not due to this simple composition 
effect, in a sensitivity analysis, we eliminate progressively courses of duration inferior to 1 
day, 2 days, etc. up to 7 days and re-estimate our models of Table 5.22 While eliminating one-
day courses reduces the estimated elasticity of training to the wage premium by about 10-15% 
— which remains nonetheless significant at conventional statistical levels — this elasticity 
tends to increase as longer courses are eliminated and is even bigger than our baseline 
estimate if courses shorter or equal to 7 days are excluded.23 
 
 
 
22
 We stop the exercise at 7 days since, after elimination of courses of length smaller or equal to 1 week, we are 
left with only 25 valid clusters, due to our size thresholds in their definition. 
23
 Several other sensitivity exercises — as regards specification, estimation method, computation of the wage 
growth differential and variations in the sample — are reported in the working paper version of this 
article (Bassanini and Brunello [2006]). 
  
 
22 
5. Conclusions  
 
 According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, only the 
worker will invest in general training, since she is the only agent who can reap the benefits 
from the investment. To the extent that labour market imperfections are of limited empirical 
relevance as regards training, the Becker model represents a simple and powerful model to 
think about training in practical terms. We can test this statement by looking at the predictions 
of the model concerning the relationship between the training wage premium and training. In 
the Becker model, we expect that the greater the wage premium the greater the training 
investment. By contrast, as a large body of literature has pointed out, when labour markets are 
imperfectly competitive firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure 
is compressed, that is if the increase of productivity after training is faster than the increase in 
pay. In this case, a negative relationship between the training wage premium and training 
might emerge, to the extent that the training wage premium is not positively correlated with 
wage compression. 
 In this paper, we contribute to the literature that tries to shed light on the empirical 
relevance of alternative theories of training, by exploiting the cross–country variation in 
training incidence and training wage premia within the European Union. We find that the 
probability of receiving general training, proxied in the paper with off-site training, is higher 
in clusters — defined by country, sector, occupation and educational attainment — with a 
lower differential between the median wage growth of trained and untrained employees. 
Importantly, the negative and statistically significant correlation between the training wage 
premium and training incidence does not appear to reflect the potential endogeneity of the 
former variable.  
 While statistically significant, the estimated impact of changes in the training wage 
premium on the probability of general training is rather small: conditional on an extended set 
of controls, a one percent increase in the wage growth differential is expected to reduce the 
probability of general training by about 0.03 percent. However, to the extent that productivity 
gains from training and training wage premia are not negatively correlated, this number is 
likely to be only a lower bound estimate of the effect of wage compression on general 
training. Should matched employer-employee data on training become available on a cross-
country comparable basis, the magnitude of the effect of wage compression on training 
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incidence could be precisely estimated using our empirical framework, by controlling for the 
productivity gains from training at the individual and firm level. 
 Overall, our findings suggest that competitive theories of the labour market, which 
imply a positive relationship between the training wage premium and the incidence of general 
training, provide insufficient guidance to interpret empirical training patterns. Conversely, 
training patterns are not inconsistent with the view that economic environments with higher 
wage compression can help firms organize and pay for general training, as predicted by the 
recent theories of training in imperfect labour markets. 
 
Appendix:  
 
A.1 Definition of co-variates and descriptive statistics 
 
 Wage growth differentials are defined in terms of gross hourly wages, computed from normal 
gross monthly earnings in the main job at the date of the interview, by dividing them by 52/12 and by 
the number of usual weekly hours of work. Overtime pay and hours are included, but individuals who 
are either still in training in the final year or work less than 30 hours per week (despite declaring to 
work full-time) or more than 70 hours per week are excluded. Similarly, we exclude workers who 
change cluster between the two interviews (or with missing cluster affiliation in the first interview). 
Wage growth differentials (as well as log age differentials) are computed using ECHP personal 
weights. Although in principle there are 84 clusters, non-missing wage growth information for both 
individuals receiving training and not receiving training is available in 1996 only in 79 clusters (with 
an average training incidence of 15.1%).24 Furthermore, the thresholds of 30 observations and 5 
training events imply that the sample is reduced to 47 clusters, although, not surprisingly, retained 
clusters are larger and account for about 90% of observations with non-missing wage growth 
information (with an average training incidence of 14.9%). 
 As described in the text, all specifications control for age, educational attainment, occupation, 
sector and country as well as for a set of family variables. Family variables (see Table A1) include 
household type (grouped into 8 categories), a dummy for presence of children aged less than 12 years, 
a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent thinks that looking after other persons prevented him from 
working as much as he wanted, and a series of variables proxying the financial situation of the family 
(including indicators of home ownership, the burden of accommodation costs including mortgage, the 
number of rooms divided by household size and whether the household received an heritage of at least 
2000 Eur in the last 12 months). In the regressions, age is measured in years, while all other co-
variates (with the exception of wage growth differentials and rooms per household member) are 
categorical, and coded as sets of dummy variables (omitting one dummy per set for identification). We 
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 In the case of Austria, wage growth is computed for 1997, due to data quality problems. 
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consider three educational attainment levels (less than upper secondary, upper secondary, more than 
upper secondary, corresponding to standard ISCED categories 0-2, 3, and 5-7), 8 occupational groups 
(corresponding to standard ISCO-88 codes 1 to 9 with the exclusion of skilled agricultural workers, or 
ISCO-88 code 6), 13 sectors (defined according the ISIC rev. 3 classification), 4 firm size classes, a 
dummy for permanent contract, a dummy for at least one spell of unemployment since 1989, and 5 
tenure classes. Tenure is obtained as the difference between the survey year and the calendar year of 
start of the current job. We grouped the data into 5 classes rather than using a continuous variable for 
two reasons: i) the information is censored at 15 years; and ii) computed this way, tenure measures are 
highly imprecise. For example, an individual who is surveyed in December but was hired in January of 
the survey year would result having tenure shorter than another individual who started in December of 
the year before the survey year but was surveyed in January.25 The means of the co-variates used in the 
regressions are reported in Table A1. The standard deviations of age and rooms per household 
member, the only continuous variables in the sample beside the wage growth differential, are 8.1 years 
and 0.74, respectively. Information on ECHP data quality and the choice of the sample is available in 
Bassanini and Brunello [2006]. 
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 Information on the month of the interview is also available in the ECHP. However, this information is always 
missing in Germany (for confidentiality reasons) and often missing in a few other countries. For this 
reason, we opt for not using it. 
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Table A1: Means of co-variates (baseline sample: age 30 to 60 years, year: 1996). 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Age (years) 42.2 % ISIC G 14.2 
% tenure 1 year or less 12.6 % ISIC H 2.4 
% tenure 2 to 5 years 16.4 % ISIC I 6.6 
% tenure 6 to 9 years 15.1 % ISIC J 6.5 
% tenure 10 to 14 years 11.5 % ISIC K 6.9 
% tenure 15 years or more 44.4 % Austria 10.9 
% firm size less than 50 employees 45.1 % Belgium 8.0 
% firm size 50-99 employees 10.5 % France 18.8 
% firm size 100-499 employees 18.5 % Germany 16.2 
% firm size 500 employees or more 25.9 % Italy 17.6 
% tertiary education 19.1 % Spain 18.4 
% upper secondary education 43.3 % United Kingdom 10.1 
% less than upper secondary education 37.6 Family variables:  
% Legislators, senior officials and managers 9.3 Number of rooms per household member 1.39 
% Professionals 7.1 % received an heritage in the last 12 months 1.98 
% Technicians and associate professionals 12.8 % housing costs are a heavy burden 19.55 
% Clerks 10.6 % housing costs are somewhat a burden 46.45 
% Service and shop and market sales workers 5.5 % housing costs are not a problem 33.99 
% Craft and related trades workers 31.0 % house owners 71.43 
% Plant and machine operators and assemblers 16.0 % tenants 24.59 
% Elementary occupations 7.8 % with rent-free accommodation 3.98 
% previous unemployment 29.3 % limited in work effort by looking after others 0.95 
% permanent contract 89.7 % children aged less than 12 in the household 43.73 
% ISIC C+E 2.8 % one person household 5.92 
% ISIC DA 4.8 % single parent with one or more children 3.10 
% ISIC DB+DC 2.7 % couple without children 14.96 
% ISIC DD+DE 4.7 % couple with one child (aged less than 16) 13.06 
% ISIC DF-DI 7.9 % couple with two children (all children aged less than 16) 17.51 
% ISIC DJ+DK 14.2 % couple three or more children (all children 
aged less than 16) 5.43 
% ISIC DL-DN 11.1 % couple with children (at least one child aged 16 years or more) 33.46 
% ISIC F 15.2 % other households 6.56 
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